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1 Poverty and calorie inequalities within Orissa
and West Bengal
There appears to be a paradox between the
headline messages on inequality and the reality
of India’s lagging areas. While at a national level
the Gini coefficient is relatively low and has
continued to be around 0.32–0.33 over the last
two decades (during which China’s has increased
from 0.29 to 0.46), gaps are visibly widening
between rural and urban areas, across India’s
states, and within states. Drèze and Srinivasan
(1996) and Dubey and Gangopadhyay (1998)
were among the first to highlight the high and
increasing divergence below state-level using the
level of ‘NSS regions’ which presents stark
pictures about Orissa’s three and West Bengal’s
four main regions. Recently, one of the authors of
this article also has been engaged in presenting a
picture of poverty at the even lower district level
(Bhandari and Dubey 2009). While this level of
disaggregation remains technically challenging,
we believe it to be critically important as the
country’s decentralisation process increasingly
looks to give responsibilities over to the hand of
lower levels of government.
Table 1 presents the poverty and calorie results
of the analysis of the 2004–05 NSS sample
compared with the 1993–4 data.
It is clear that poverty rates and mean calorie
consumption data show great variation within
states both in terms of geographic region and in
terms of rural and urban breakdowns. Most
worryingly, the differences are stubborn and in
many cases widening. For West Bengal, the range
of poverty rates from highest to lowest has
declined somewhat across regions and between
rural/urban areas from 1993 to 2005. But
disparities in poverty rates within Orissa as
measured by range – particularly in rural areas –
have exploded over this time. For mean calorie
consumption, the range of levels within both
states – by region and by rural and urban area –
has increased dramatically across the board.
Given these variations, we argue that not enough
attention is being paid to finding out what
determines the differences within these states,
and what the implications of these are for
nutritional and anti-poverty strategies. The next
two sections look at the determinants of the high
levels of deprivation and disparities that exist
within the two states, and experiences with
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conditions under which government services can
be made to work or improve.
2 The KBK phenomenon and political economy
of emergency responses in Orissa
The KBK region (Kalahandi-Bolangir-Koraput)
of Orissa has for decades illustrated India’s worst
development problems, once again highlighted in
the most recent NSS data, and perennially
appearing in the newspapers because of the
extreme cases of starvation deaths. The Orissa
state government’s policies for the non-coastal
parts of Orissa are marked by a great deal of
neglect – even though programmes for the KBK
region have existed for decades, many ‘centrally-
sponsored’, and with Prime Ministerial attention.
The area is seen as remote and inhabited by
tribal peoples. Reports of malnutrition and even
starvation are typically denied at first, reactions
are slow, and often prompted by central
government institutions rather than driven by
motivations within the state government.
Incidences of violence are seldom satisfactorily
addressed or even investigated by the state
government. Beyond the neglect, the responses
are marked by an emergency mode: rather than
addressing the root causes of the problems,
discussed below, the response is to provide relief,
drawing on centrally-available resources (Jayal
1999).
The relation between the coastal and ‘remote’
Orissa regions is marked by deep political and
overlapping social inequalities. Orissa as a
political unit has a very short history (the
movement for a separate western Orissa state,
Koshal, has remained weak). Orissa’s political
elite – coastal, higher caste – has continued to
have a very small economic and social base
(Mohanty 1990), with limited impact of land
reforms, without the class transformations that
have happened in Andhra Pradesh for example,
and certainly not the social churning that Bihar
has witnessed. By and large, the interests of
remote areas and deprived groups remain under-
represented on the political scene.
Discrimination vis-à-vis lower castes and tribes is
deeply rooted, and the administrative
programmes and the categories it has employed
have not addressed attitudes of discrimination
(de Haan 2007).
Historically, the integration of Orissa has been
perceived and described as a process of
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colonisation, rather than development (Bailey
1957). Despite legislation, security of access to
land remains limited, and encroachment
common. Displacement has affected large
numbers of poor people, and resettlement
programmes have been poorly implemented
(much-criticised donor-supported programmes
tend to have the better conditions). Many Adivasi
families depend on forests, but deforestation,
exploitative state control over forests,
privatisation and the weak role of local
government relating to non-timber forest
products have reduced livelihood opportunities
(Saxena 2003; Pattnaik 2006), which is likely to
have been a central reason for the lack of
improvement in nutrition indicators particularly
in those areas.
The role of local governance in access to natural
resources is an example of the broader problem
of decentralisation in Orissa.1 Legislation for
decentralisation in Orissa has been progressive,
for example through the introduction of a fourth
layer of local governance (relevant because of the
dispersion of population in the state). But
socioeconomic inequalities appear to reproduce
political inequalities negatively affecting the
potential that local governments will effectively
implement programmes (PRAXIS 2002).
Finally, in assessing the effectiveness and the
role of local governance it is important to assess
the role of civil society and social mobilisation.
Despite a number of very strong NGOs in Orissa,
its reputation has been damaged – for various
reasons including allegation of corruption and its
commercialisation after the cyclone – and
collaboration with government has remained
weak in general (thus limiting its role in
programme implementation). More critically, as
already indicated, and with the significant
exception of protests against development-
induced displacement, social mobilisation and
articulation of voice among the large numbers of
deprived groups have remained limited, thus
limiting bottom-up processes that could
strengthen accountability.
The history of poverty responses in Orissa thus
illustrates a worst case, an area where
multidimensional forms of exclusion have kept
large groups in deep poverty and malnourished
for long periods of time, despite existence of
extensive policy frameworks. The predominant
emergency mode of response has not worked, and
has enabled policy makers to avoid addressing
deeply-rooted forms of exclusion. For poverty and
nutrition policies to be effective there is an
urgent need to strengthen accountability.
3 Improving service delivery: strengthening local
governance in West Bengal
West Bengal’s socioeconomic history is radically
different from Orissa. It has performed better
than Orissa in poverty reduction as latest NSS
data in Table 1 indicate, though perhaps less well
than expected given its political leaders’
demonstrated commitment to rural development
and equity. In this section, we discuss one of the
recent efforts to strengthen and enhance the
effectiveness of programmes to reduce poverty by
strengthening local governance and rural
decentralisation. We argue that it can be seen as
a test case of the importance of local
participation for improving service delivery,
although we have doubts about its relevance for
an extreme context such as Orissa.2
West Bengal’s government has recently
committed itself to strengthening
decentralisation, but prior to that the political
ideology of the Left Front served as the driver of
decentralisation. Strengthening local
governments has been a tool for sharing power
and a means for the party to reach out to the
rural masses. Decentralisation is seen as the
foundation for equitable development, taking
administration close to people and addressing
rural poverty and improving the delivery of
services for all.
Recent initiatives emphasise participatory or
bottom up planning, and intensive hamlet level
mobilisation and annual planning across the 12
poorest districts of the state. The government is
progressively devolving finances and functions to
Panchayats, with departments directly
transferring money to Panchayats, with, for
example, health workers reporting to them. The
state ranks among the top of the league on the
devolution index for the country, where Orissa is
among the worst performers.3
Savings and credit groups or self-help groups
(SHGs) at the hamlet level form the bedrock for
women’s participation in panchayat activities.
Over two-thirds of women are members of SHGs
and typically participate in hamlet level panchayat
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meetings. The SHGs have served as a key to the
economic and political empowerment of women
and is translating into ‘voice and influence’ in
the allocation of private and public goods.
The government has set up a comprehensive
capacity building plan for elected representatives
and the panchayat officials, to build capacities of
the leaders of all tiers to manage resources,
collect revenues and accounting, plan and deliver
services. Premier academic institutions like IIM
Kolkata have been used to train elected Panchayat
heads, and support gram panchayats through a
network of mobile trainers and the use of district
and extension training centres.
The institutionalised mechanisms to increase
participation of citizens in developing and
implementing plans and improving transparency
and accountability in the functioning of
Panchayats appear to be working. Hamlet level
meetings are a regular feature of Panchayats in
West Bengal, which decide for example on
allocation of budgets for public investments
including the various poverty reduction
programmes. Participation levels are typically
high for all social groups, including women.
To deepen transparency in service provisioning
and administration, the government has
legislated to promote disclosure norms by all
Panchayats (and organise social audits from 2009
onwards). It has made it mandatory to display
the budget, names of beneficiaries for all poverty
reduction programmes, and the public
investments planned for the year. All households
also receive the annual report of the gram
panchayat including income and expenditure
statements.
The combination of efforts – community
mobilisation, transparency mechanisms, capacity
building of officials and elected representatives,
and enhanced financial devolution – is having
positive impacts. 
According to the evaluation (Sambodhi
forthcoming) and other studies:4
Over 90 per cent of the GP plans reflect hamlet
level priorities with the majority of the
development expenditure targeted at the poor,
specifically the SC and ST (data on effectiveness of
targeting to social groups will soon be available).
z Three out of four households participate
regularly in panchayat meetings with one-third
claiming to influence decision-making.
Significantly, according to the evaluation,
officials were in post, which allows citizens to
hold them to account. The system of
disclosure is operating effectively.
z Decentralisation has resulted in improvement
in access and delivery of basic services
specifically for drinking water, primary
healthcare, education and toilets.5 Eight out of
ten households perceive an improvement in
the delivery of basic services, including all
centrally sponsored schemes across project
villages. These improvements will be further
corroborated by the independent citizen’s
report card which is due soon.6
z Efficient functioning of panchayats is also
contributing to increased income and assets
for 70 per cent of poor households. Just under
half of these households demonstrate a
growth of 15–30 per cent in their average
household income. More than 35 per cent of
the households indicate significant or highly
significant increase in livelihood assets, which
they are using to diversify economic activities,
including livestock, trading and small business
opportunities. The project has also provided
financial services to the poor, through the
improved network of SHGs.
z Finally, the impact evaluation indicates a
significant increase in revenue generation by
panchayats, mainly through non-tax revenues
like rental income, trade licences and user
charges. The capacity building is also
resulting in Panchayats effectively leveraging
and using more resources through the
Centrally-Sponsored Schemes (Shyam 2008),
and in increasing community contributions.
Decentralisation seems essential in the delivery
of India’s development programmes, but this is
not enough. The West Bengal experience
indicates that it needs to go hand in hand with
capacity building of elected representatives and
officials and community mobilisation. Equally
important are the investments to enhance the
efficiency of panchayats specifically to manage its
resources and plan effectively for the future.
4 Conclusion
The key concern of this article is the high level of
disparity within Indian states both from poverty
and food consumption perspectives and as a
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reflection of disparities in voice and
accountability. The marked differences between
states are well known (Harriss 1999). Here we
are particularly concerned with the differences
within states, and particularly the institutional
and policy conditions that determine the
different performance of development
programmes.
A particular concern is that programmes seem to
work least well where they are most needed.
Orissa illustrates this case and highlights that
poverty and undernutrition are part of a much
broader development failure, rooted in deep
social and political inequalities. It is unlikely that
successful experiences from elsewhere can be
transplanted straightforwardly – or even at all –
to these most deprived areas.
The West Bengal experience is equally unique. It
has a long history of political mobilisation, which
arguably makes new initiatives more likely to
succeed than in Orissa. West Bengal too has
remained remarkably poor, and with large
inequalities too, of a different nature, but
equally deep-rooted. But the experience with the
decentralisation programme is encouraging.
Decentralisation provisions have been the same
across all Indian states, but they appear to have
had little impact in Orissa.
In West Bengal, while it is still early days, the
evidence on the capacity building of local officials
combined with social mobilisation, around
specific service delivery issues, indicates that
conditions can be created under which
development programmes can be made to work
better. For Orissa, more analysis and
experimentation is necessary for solutions to
emerge to reduce the disparities within the state.
Such solutions have to come from within the
state itself, and success of externally-driven
efforts and programmes will depend on
strengthened local capacity, commitment and
accountability.
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Notes
* The views expressed in this article do not
necessarily represent those of DFID.
1 See Rajaraman and Sinha (2007a) on a
comparison of functional devolution in four of
India’s poorest states. Rural decentralisation
follows Constitutional provisions at the
national level. The 73rd Constitutional
Amendment Act, enacted by the national
Parliament, supports state governments to
empower PRIs and to strengthen the
participation of women and other weaker
sections in panchayats.
2 The programme includes monitoring at least
two points, and the first report is now available
– the rest of this section relies mainly on this
(Sambodhi 2009 and Sambodhi forthcoming;
De 2009).
3 Ministry of Panchayati Raj 2008. According to
a Ministry Press Note of 2 March 2009, West
Bengal came 2nd in a National ranking of
effective devolution, while Orissa came 18th
(slightly better than Bihar).
4 De 2009; Govinda Rao and Vasanth Rao 2008;
Srinivasan et al. 2007; Rajaraman and Sinha
2007a, 2007b.
5 The impact evaluation indicates that 3 per
cent to 5 per cent more households access
these services in project gram panchayats as
compared to control villages.
6 Under NREGA over 90 per cent of the poor
have been employed, which is 20 per cent
more as compared with the control villages.
Similarly, more numbers of out of school
children end up enrolling and completing
primary education across these panchayats.
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